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Abstract
Hidden information is a critical issue for the successful delivery of services
in grid systems. It arises when the agents (hardware and software resources)
employed to serve a task belong to multiple administrative domains, thus ren-
dering monitoring of remote resource provision absent or unreliable. There-
fore, the grid service broker can often observe only the outcome of the col-
lective effort of groups of agents rather than their individual efforts, which
makes it hard to identify cases of free-riding or low-performing agents. In
this paper, we first identify cases of hidden information in grid systems and
explain why they cannot be handled satisfactorily by the existing accounting
systems. Second, we develop and evaluate a reputation-based mechanism
enabling the grid service broker to deal effectively with hidden information.
Our mechanism maintains a reputation metric for each agent; we propose
and evaluate several approaches on how to update this metric based only on
the observations of collective outcomes. We also provide recommendation on
which such approach is preferable for a grid service broker in collaborative
or competitive environments.
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1. Introduction
A grid virtual organization (VO) allows the seamless aggregation of com-
putational resources in multiple administrative domains into a single pool.
Thus, users have the opportunity to lease for a certain time-frame bundles of
software, CPU cycles, bandwidth and storage space in order to execute com-
putationally intensive tasks, according to a service level agreement (SLA)
between the user and the grid service broker. The inclusion of strict or sta-
tistical QoS guarantees in the SLAs and the conformance of grid services to
them are considered very important for the commercial viability of grid ser-
vice provision [1], especially in competitive environments. The user however
is unaware of the exact resources that execute his task. Thus, the grid service
broker must select an appropriate set out of the pool of available resources
and offer them to the user as a bundle, henceforth referred to as group (or
cluster). This selection is subject to the adverse effects of hidden informa-
tion on the effort exerted by each agent representing a resource owner in the
group. Even if each agent does have the incentive to perform as agreed (e.g.
due to the revenue to be earned) it may also prefer to free-ride and save on
the associated cost of the effor. The broker often has reliable information
only on the outcome of the collective effort rather than the individual effort
of the agents constituting such a group (see Section 3). However, assessing an
individual agent’s performance is important for selecting the resources to be
employed in future service instances, which in general are to be executed by
different group of agents each, overlapping only in part with previous ones.
Therefore, a complementary mechanism is needed to aid the broker estimate
individual performance, despite the lack of relevant accurate information.
The contribution of this paper is twofold: a) We identify and classify cases
of information asymmetry in grids. b) We propose and evaluate several
approaches for estimating the individual performance of agents based on
collective outcomes and in the presence of ratings or not. The importance of
our subject is also emphasized in [2], where it is stated that “one customer’s
poor behavior can affect the reputation of the cloud as a whole”. To the best
of our knowledge both our contribution on information asymmetry in grids
and our reputation-based approaches for alleviating this are innovative.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: We first discuss (in
Section 2) general issues about hidden information and reputation as well as
related work. Then, in Section 3, we identify cases of hidden information in
grid systems and explain why and when they cannot be handled satisfacto-
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rily by the available grid accounting systems. In Section 4, we formulate the
objective of the broker and that of each individual agent. Then, in Section 5,
we develop our reputation-based mechanism. We employ a reputation metric
for each of the agents and propose and evaluate certain estimation approaches
on how to update this metric on the basis of the observations of collective
outcomes. In Section 6, the effectiveness of our estimation approaches for
individual performance is evaluated by means of simulation experiments in
three scenarions: a) a single VO employing each of the approaches, b) mul-
tiple VOs employing collaboratively each of the approaches, and c) multiple
competitive VOs each employing a different estimation approach. In systems
where individual performance can be observed by other agents of the group,
reputation may be based on their ratings for this performance. We show
that the availability of even a few such ratings can considerably improve the
accuracy of performance estimation, if the agents in the group can achieve
Byzantine agreement against liars. Otherwise, a simple deterministic ap-
proach is preferable. Clearly, if a broker can estimate accurately enough the
expected individual performance of the agents in its VO, then he can increase
its own reputation in the grid market and thus be more competitive. Based
on our results, we propose which estimation approach should be used by the
grid service brokers to estimate the individual performance of agents in com-
petitive or collaborative environments. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude our
work.
2. Background and Related Work
Many times in markets buyers and sellers share different portions of in-
formation for a service that is exchanged. This situation is referred to as
information asymmetry. For example, sellers may be more informed on the
quality of the product they offer than clients, or the former does not know the
paying behavior of the latter. Depending on the specific information that is
hidden, two different problems having different effects may arise in a market:
moral hazard (i.e. post-contractual opportunism) and adverse selection (i.e.
misreported inferior quality). In moral hazard, each party in a contract may
have the opportunity to gain by violating the principle terms of the agree-
ment [3]. It may lead to market decomposition, as agents may be better off
to leave this market for a more robust one. In adverse selection, true service
quality is misreported to clients. Such a situation will eventually drive all
sellers out of the market, except for the lowest quality ones, thus leading to
3
a “market of lemons”, as explained by Akerlof in [4]. Reputation is a proper
means for revealing hidden information [5].
Previous works applying reputation in grids are based either on user’s
rating of the agent’s individual performance [6], [7], or on event monitoring
the deviation of the actual agent’s individual performance from the promised
one [8]. Also, the approach in [9] calculates indirect reputation based on Re-
source Usage Records (RUR) [10] and decreases reputation in their absense.
In [11], trust for grid nodes is calculated based on the exchange of vectors of
direct experience among nodes for various service contexts. The grid nodes
are organized per institution and multiple institutions belong to a VO. The
global trust of an entity is derived from the reliability of its institution and
the trust of the entity as perceived within the institution. In case of collective
service outcomes in grid environments, group reputation becomes relevant.
According to Tirole [12], collective reputations are history-dependent. Group
reputation results to a certain characterization (or stereotype) of a group,
which is long-lasting; i.e., members inherit the collective reputation of their
elders. Also, according to Levy [13], the higher the information transparency
for group members’ performance, the higher the member’s incentive to per-
form better. Otherwise, there is potential for group members to free-ride on
the high performance of other members and put the blame on others for a
collective service of low quality.
Also, [14] deals with the problem of trust and sabotage-tolerance in vol-
unteer grid computing environments. Sabotage-tolerance is very related to
our work as we also care about successful collective outcomes. Three cat-
egories of sabotage-tolerance techniques are identified: a) replication and
voting, b) sampling, c) checkpoint-based techniques. Under replication, the
results of replicas are compared and a majority voting is applied. The results
not agreeing with the majority are marked as erroneous. Under sampling,
the supervisor sends some test samples along with the application tasks and
checks the results sent back by the workers. There are several sampling tech-
niques, but it is hardly feasible to generate indistinguishable tests for generic
computations. Under checkpoint-based techniques, the supervisor asks at
a checkpoint-time the state of computation from the worker, executes the
task up to the next checkpoint-time, hashes the results and compares the
hash with the corresponding hashcode sent by the worker. However, central-
ized checkpoint verification bear too much communication and processing
overhead to the supervisor, while in the decentralized version redundancy of
workers used as verifiers and direct communication capability among work-
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ers are necessary. In this paper, we investigate the effectiveness of “cheaper”
approaches for revealing individual performance that are also applicable to
the case of complex workflow tasks.
Finally, [15] proposes a superscheduler in a federation of trusted or mon-
itored clusters utilizing a commodity market-based approach. Jobs are as-
signed to fastest or cheapest clusters that have the necessary resources (i.e.
number of processors, processing speed, communication bandwidth) to com-
plete the job within the time and budget constraints. However, in this fed-
erated environment, clusters can significantly gain by pretending to have the
fastest resources, so as to be assigned the jobs and then just complete them
slower but within the time constraints for successful service outcome. In our
approach, we make no assumptions on the trustworthiness of processors or
clusters and we do not rely on the advertised quality of processors. Instead,
we estimate their true quality and assigned the jobs to the required number
of the most efficient processors.
3. Information Asymmetry in Grids
In this section, we analyze information asymmetry issues that arise in
grids and how they can be alleviated by means of reputation. First, we
discuss incentive issues on the collection of accounting information in grids.
Grid Accounting and Incentives: There are available solutions for
secure aggregation of accounting information on remote resources’ consump-
tion in grids. When mobile agents [16] or web services [17] are employed
for metering and secure communication channels are used for transferring
the relevant data, then much credibility can be attained for accounting in-
formation. However, in an open environment (i.e. not an enterprise grid),
credible metering can be tricky, since a resource owner (i.e. agent) may have
the incentive to manipulate accounting information on his resources’ con-
sumption. For example, the owner may claim higher resource consumption
than the actual one, in order to hide his low effort or to earn more money.
Also, if there exist resource owners that aggregate or relay accounting infor-
mation of others, then they may attempt to manipulate this too, in order
to serve their individual objectives (e.g. demote competitors) or for mali-
cious purposes. Due to these conflicting incentives, information asymmetry
on resource consumption in open grids may still arise despite the employ-
ment of sophisticated and costly accounting mechanisms. For example, even
if the CPU time is accurately metered, the processor speed of the resource
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owner may be different than agreed with the user, who cannot verify the
CPU type. Another example arises if host-level rootkits (kernel, library or
application ones) that manipulate the output of accounting/monitoring tools
for resource consumption in remote hosts are employed by a resource owner.
Also, authentication procedures that are involved in the various grid account-
ing solutions [16, 17, 18, 10] do not reveal hidden type (i.e. quality) or oppor-
tunistic behavior of agents. Consequently, different degrees of information
asymmetry may arise in grid accounting. In DGAS [18] and in GridBank [10]
accounting architectures the use of direct (i.e. money) and indirect (i.e. re-
ciprocation) rewards provides agents with incentives for misbehavior. In case
of pre-payment, an agent has no incentive for job completion, while in case
of post-payment he has the incentive to manipulate accounting information.
This also applies to the case of the “pay-as-you-go” charging scheme used in
Gridbank. Collusions among participating entities provide further incentives
for such behaviors and for negative/ positive discrimination of price and QoS
to others. Therefore, both adverse selection and moral hazard problems may
arise in grids. We describe the various cases below:
Observable Individual Effort: First, note that in case of accurate and
credible metering, hidden information on the quality of resources offered by
agents and their behavior (i.e. effort spent, honesty etc.) in a grid envi-
ronment could be revealed directly to the user by means of reputation, if
requested for decision making on selection of a suitable grid virtual organi-
zation (VO) for his needs, as in [7]. The type or behavior of agents may
remain fixed or vary dynamically. Thus, a proper reputation metric should
be employed for each case, i.e. Bayes or Beta [19] respectively. Reputation
can also be used by a provider coordinating a grid VO in order to select the
group of available agents to assign a complex task.
Observable Individual Outcome not Effort: A different case of hid-
den information arises when only the service provision outcome of a task
assignment is observable, due to the fact that the consumption of the asso-
ciated individual resources (or, even more, the associated effort or quality)
cannot be accurately metered. This paradigm fits better to the case of bag-
of-task jobs, where the objective for high throughput of task execution places
demanding performance requirements to accounting mechanisms. Another
such case of hidden information arises when resource providers reside in re-
mote administrative domains and therefore the output of accounting mech-
anisms for resource consumption can be unreliable, as explained earlier in
this section. Then, reputation (based on user ratings) can be a proper means
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for approximating the expected performance outcome of an agent performing
individual tasks. However, the actual quality of resources or the performance
strategy of the agent will remain hidden information.
Observable but Unverifiable Individual Outcome: Amore interest-
ing case of hidden information can arise when there is no reliable metering
at the individual agent’s level; this applies when inter-VO clusters can be
formed or in an open grid resource market. Handling this case effectively is
very important, as tamper-proof metering of consumption of the resources
of a remote agent can be very costly in terms of communication and com-
putational overhead. Tamper-proof accounting can be even impossible due
to either the local security policies of a third party that owns the individual
agent or insecure system/kernel modules installed in the remote agent. More-
over, hidden information can arise when there is no detailed specification of
the expected performance and intermediate by each individual agent, which
is a common case for complex workflow tasks. Subtasks may depend on
other subtasks, which in turn depend on others, etc. Also, an agent may be
assigned multiple subtasks, thus the relevant dependency graph at the level
of agents (i.e. which agent has to wait for which ones to complete their tasks
etc.) would very likely contain circles that complicate accountability. Since
there is no detailed specification of the expected performance per agent, it is
very hard to employ verification approaches, such as those in [14] except for
replication. Sonnek et al. [20] also employs replication of each subtask as-
signment to multiple agents selected on the basis of reputation; the outcome
for this subtask is determined by means of the majority rule. In this paper,
we also assume that there is some redundancy employed, leading to tolerance
of few under-performing agents, yet more economically than replication of
each individual agent as in [20]. The focus of our work in Sections 4-6 is to
show how reputation can be exploited in this context. Also, the prediction of
the future individual performance of agents based on distributed monitoring
of resource consumption is performed in [8], [21]. However, this approach
cannot be employed in environments where the monitoring information may
be manipulated by malicious agents.
Observable Collective Outcome: In systems where individual perfor-
mance can be observed (e.g. peer-to-peer and e-markets), reputation is based
on the rating of this performance by the user. Clearly this is not possible
in the grids of our focus, where the user can only rate collective outcomes.
On the other hand, certain agents of the group may be able to rate the per-
formance of others, if they exchange intermediate results of a workflow task
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and they can verify their correctness. However, the credibility of such ratings
is questionable, especially, if the agents are strategically rating each other
when competing in being assigned tasks. This can be tolerated to a certain
extent; see Sections 5-6.
In the rest of the paper, we employ reputation in the most interesting
case of asymmetric information among those discussed above; namely that
of verifiable group outcome and hidden/unverifiable individual effort. There
are very interesting examples of grid services to which this case of information
asymmetry applies. E.g.: a) A distributed search engine implemented by a
group of grid agents that search in different sets of data: a query may fail
due to an agent that is under-performing either inherently or intentionally;
even if a query is served satisfactorily it may be hard to determine whether
all group members performed as required. b) A group of agents serving as
a sequence of video streaming servers forming paths from the root to the
leaves of a multicast tree: the failure of an individual agent may lead to the
collapse of a sub-tree; identifying the source of the problem may not be easy.
4. The Participants’ Optimization Problems
In this section, we formulate the optimization problems expressing the
decision-making process of the grid broker (who selects and schedules the
agents to provide their resources per task) and of the participating agents.
We consider an inter-domain virtual organization (VO), where a large num-
ber of agents can offer their resources to users. Workflow tasks are assigned
to groups of agents. At any given time of a task request, an agent i is either
available (i.e. has available resources), with probability ai, or unavailable
with probability 1−ai. This availability is also related to the quality and the
stability of its hardware resources. An agent i has an inherit performance
capability, i.e. quality qi, which is private information, e.g. qi can be the
pair (CPU speed, link bandwidth) of resource i. The individual performance
outcome of an agent i is given by xi(qi). If the agent belongs to a fixed
performance type j, then xi follows the corresponding distribution; e.g. in-
dividual performance xi(qi) can be at some acceptable level (implying that
the agent exerted the effort required thereby) with a fixed probability pj,
independently of other events in the system. On the other hand, if agent
i is rational, then it follows a dynamic strategy according to which xi(qi)
is selected each time. The performance outcome of a group of grid agents
is determined by the collective effort of its members. In particular, for a
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group S with size |S| whose members’ performance capabilities are given by
the vector ~x = (xi, . . .) s.t. i ∈ S, the collective outcome of the group is
a function g(~x). The function g(.) expresses the effectiveness of the inte-
gration of the grid resources, their level of homogeneity etc. In general, we
can reasonably assume that g(~x) is monotonically increasing in every xi s.t.
i ∈ S, i.e. more resources lead to increased effectiveness. For example, if
g(.) expresses total processing capacity and xi(qi) is equal to the processing
speed, then we can simply use g(~x) =
∑
i=1,...,|S| xi. If the resources offered by
the agents are heterogeneous, then defining g(~x) is more complicated; e.g., if
we deal with both CPU cycles and storage space, then g(~x) is a function of
the two corresponding partial sums. Furthermore, according to the SLA, the
broker should offer to the user at least a minimum quality level φ in order
for the task to be considered as successful. Besides being compliant to the
SLA, the broker may be interested in allocating resources efficiently in order
to serve successfully as many tasks as possible, i.e. attain high throughput.
In such a case, the broker should select the group S of agents so that the
expected performance both exceeds the minimum requirement and matches
it as closely as possible for cost-effectiveness. This objective corresponds to
the optimization problem:
S = argmin
~x
E[g(~x)], s.t. E[g(~x)] ≥ φ (1)
In general, this is a combinatorial problem with exponential (in the number
of agents) computational complexity. A simpler approach is for the broker to
select the group S of nodes so that the expected performance for the present
task is maximized yet in an economic way, i.e. reducing the opportunity cost
allowing the concurrent provision of services to other users as well. To this
end, we assume that up to fixed number N of agents are employed for each
task. We henceforth adopt this unconstrained broker’s optimization problem:
S = argmax
~x
E[g(~x)] (2)
In order to solve either of the above optimization problems, the broker should
be aware of the performance capabilities or of the relevant strategy of each
agent. Note that, under this approach, working groups have a fixed size
N , as only then the objective function of equation (2) is maximized. As
explained in Section 3, this constitutes hidden information. Nevertheless,
reputation leads to the revelation of the expected individual performance (as
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opposed to the exact computational capabilities and strategies of the agents).
Thus, we have to adopt a heuristic approach to solve the above optimization
problem, in which reputation is employed as a proxy of xi. In particular, we
assume that each time a new task arises, the broker sorts the available agents
in descending order of reputation and selects an adequate number starting
from the top; that is, the broker employs the best amongst the awaiting
agents, this approach is employed in the experiments of Section 6. Under
this greedy approach, agents with low or even medium reputation cannot be
selected. An alternative approach would be to give all agents a chance to
be selected, while favoring the ones with higher reputation. This is attained
by means of the following randomized selection rule: when a new agent is
to be added to a group each agent’s selection probability equals ri/
∑
j rj,
i.e. is proportional to its reputation. This is a more fair approach than the
selection of the agents with top reputation. Although, when viewed in a long
series of selections, the two approaches do not differ considerably w.r.t. the
expected number of times each agent is selected. This applies when, for each
task request, each agent i has a considerable probability 1 − ai to not be
available to participate in the corresponding group.
Next, we deal with the optimization problem faced by each individual
agent. We assume that the broker offers the agents the incentives to partici-
pate to working groups, by sharing the revenues of collective service outcomes
to them. However, individual performance demands costly effort. We take
that individual performance is approximated by means of reputation and the
broker selects the agents that form working groups for each task on the ba-
sis of a reputation-based policy. Then, as argued in [22] (yet for a different
setting), when appropriately selected, such a policy provides each agent with
the incentive to exert the maximum possible effort in collective service provi-
sion. Thus, it is beneficial for the broker to employ a reputation metric that
reveals each agent’s expected individual performance.
5. Our Approach
Next, we study how individual expected performance of agents can be re-
vealed by associating to each agent i a reputation metric ri that is properly
updated on the basis of collective outcomes. In particular, we study how
this update can be done under both the Bayes and the Beta [19] aggregation
rules, according to which ri expresses the probability of successful individual
performance of agent i. According to Beta aggregation, each agent’s repu-
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tation equals the fraction of the “weighted number” of her successful service
provisions over the “weighted total number” of her service provisions, with
the weight of each service provision being a negative exponential function of
the elapsed time. We have also studied other update approaches based on
arbitrary scoring metrics that also lead to the ordering of agents according to
their performance. Such approaches constitute hybrid methods among those
studied in this paper and thus we omit these studies and results for clarity.
We study two different cases of available information in a group of agents:
• intermediate outcomes of the computations may be exchanged among
the nodes during the collective computation;
• no intermediate outcomes are exchanged among individual nodes; e.g.
when individual outcomes are sent to a coordinating agent that com-
poses the final outcome delivered to the user.
In the case where intermediate outcomes are available, the agents partic-
ipating in a group that performs a certain task may have information on the
individual outcome of some others and on the lowest performance threshold
φi that each member i of the group S should meet in order for the collec-
tive performance to meet threshold φ. Therefore, nodes are able to rate the
performance of others. We consider two different rating approaches the ap-
plicability of which depends on the amount of information available to the
members of a group about other members: RATE ALL and RATE ONE.
According to the RATE ALL approach, each agent j submits a rating vector
vj for all other members i of its group to the broker. The rating vector is
given by the following formula:
vj[i] =
{
1, if xi ≥ φi
−1, if xi < φi
}
,∀i ∈ S (3)
Then, the broker sums the rating of each of the members and updates its
reputation, according to Beta rule, as follows:
r′i =


βriti+1
βti+1
, if
∑
j vj[i] > d
βriti
βti+1
, if
∑
j vj[i] < −d
ri, if
∣∣∣∑j vj[i]∣∣∣ ≤ d
, ∀i ∈ S

 (4)
ti is the number of task computations of agent i before the present task,
β ∈ (0, 1) is the factor that discounts the weight of past transactions, and
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d is a confidence threshold; the higher the level of confidence required for
the outcome of the rating procedure, the higher d. Clearly, formula (4)
corresponds to a majority rule.
On the other hand, according to the RATE ONE approach, each agent
rates the performance of another randomly selected member of its group ac-
cording to (3) and submits this rating to the broker. Again, the broker sums
the ratings for each member of the group and updates reputations according
to a majority rule such as that of (4). The two approaches defined above con-
stitute “extreme” cases w.r.t availability of rating information. Intermediate
cases are also conceivable, but are not further studied.
The exchange of intermediate outcomes among agents cannot be assumed
in certain cases, such as that of inter-organizational VOs (due to poten-
tially low trust, long interconnection lines that introduce high communi-
cation cost/latency and NAT/Firewalls among organization) and when the
assigned tasks are replicas of standalone ones. Indeed, trust can be low in
the case that agents belonging to competing organizations constitute the VO
and in open grid environments where agents are competitive to each other.
If the agents are competitive, then the credibility of their ratings to each
other cannot be taken for granted. For example, an agent may have the in-
centive to submit false or malicious ratings and promote co-members in the
working group that belong to the same organization and demote co-members
that belong to competitive organizations. As will be seen in Section 6, in
this case, the effectiveness of rating-based reputation update approaches is
reduced. As we showed in [23], this issue can be effectively dealt with by
a specific mechanism providing the incentives for reporting truthful ratings
exploiting disagreement of ratings as an evidence of lying. For simplicity, in
this paper, we assume that no such mechanism is employed in the system,
although some agents may rate others untruthfully. If no intermediate out-
comes are available, the broker has to infer individual performance on the
basis of collective outcomes only. For simplicity, in each case of a successful
collective outcome, we take that all group members have exerted high effort
and we increase the reputation values of all group members. We propose the
following approaches for updating reputation of group members after a failed
service provision:
• Punish all equally (PUNISH ALL): decrease the reputation of each
agent of the group as in the middle case of (4).
• Punish probabilistically fairly to reputation (PROP): The reputation
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of a member i is updated according to the middle case of (4) but with
probability ri/
∑
j rj, where the j’s are all group members. Thus, the
group members share the blame of the collective failure according to
their expected performance.
• Punish probabilistically “inversely” to reputation (INVERSE ): The
reputation of a member i now decreases according to the middle case
of (4) with probability (1− ri)/
∑
j(1− rj).
Furthermore, if we can assume that the grid broker has some idea of how
many agents did not perform adequately, thus leading the whole group to a
failure, then there are more possibilities. To illustrate them, while keeping
our study simple, we adopt the following assumption: A group S fails in a
service provision (i.e. has lower collective performance than acceptable) if at
least M of its members do not exert the necessary effort. Then, the broker
can punish only M members, by lowering their reputation, while leaving
intact that of all other members of the group. We propose the following two
punishing approaches:
• Punish the worst M (WORST M ): sort the reputation values in de-
scending order and decrease the reputation of theM members with the
lowest reputation values according to the middle case of (4).
• Punish random M (RANDOM M ): Decrease the reputation values of
M random group members as above.
So far we have only dealt with reputation in accordance to Beta rule.
Next, we employ Bayes’ rule for updating agents’ individual reputation val-
ues based on their collective outcome. Bayes approach is a standard one for
approximating hidden variables. Our setting can be considered as a special
case of a Bayesian network of star topology with the broker being the hub
node and the agents being one hop away. This approach (BAYES ) is appli-
cable when there are specific fixed performance types of nodes with known
success probabilities. For simplicity, we assume that there are two perfor-
mance types High (H) and Low (L) of agents that have success probabilities
pH , pL respectively. Then after a failure collective service outcome (F ), the
reputation ri of the individual agent i is computed according to the formulas
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below (6).
r′i = Pr[Ai ∈ H|F ]
=
Pr[F |Ai ∈ H] · Pr[Ai ∈ H]
Pr[F |Ai ∈ H] · Pr[Ai ∈ H] + Pr[F |Ai ∈ L] · Pr[Ai ∈ L]
,
(5)
where Pr[F |Ai ∈ H], Pr[F |Ai ∈ H] are given by the formulas below:
Pr[F |Ai ∈ H] = pH · Pr[≥M + 1 agents fail] + (1− pH) · Pr[≥M agents fail] ,
Pr[F |Ai ∈ L] = pL · Pr[≥M + 1 agents fail] + (1− pL) · Pr[≥M agents fail] ,
Pr[≥M agents fail] =
∑N−1
m=M
∑∑
j 6=i
vj=m
Πj 6=ip
vj
j (1− pj)
1−vj and
pj = rj · pH + (1− rj) · pL .
A formula similar to (5) applies to the case of a successful collective outcome.
In the next section, we compare by means of simulation experiments this
standard approach with the previous ones for updating reputation that incur
less processing overhead.
6. Experimental Results
6.1. The Simulation Model
In order to examine the effectiveness of the various heuristic approaches
for estimating the hidden performance of an individual agent, we perform a
series of simulation experiments. Initially, we evaluate the estimation ap-
proaches employing a single virtual organization (VO) in a monopolistic
scenario. Then, we evaluate the performance of each estimation approach
employed by a consortium of collaborative grid service brokers that share
the user requests and seek to achieve the highest possible social welfare, i.e.
overall success ratio. This scenario can be realistic in settings where a single
VO is not capable of handling all user requests due to limited capacity. Fi-
nally, in a third scenario, we assume competition among grid service brokers
that follow different estimation approaches and evaluate the latter in terms
of achievable throughput of successfully served requests in this case.
For this purpose, we first define in Mathematica a simulation model with
a single grid VO consisting of 100 agents. We assume that the population
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of agents belongs to equal shares of two fixed performance types, namely
“High” and “Low” that succeed in service provision with probabilities 0.9
and 0.1 respectively. The performance type of an agent is approximated
by a reputation metric that is updated according to the various approaches
introduced in the previous section. Initially, each agent is assigned an inter-
mediate reputation value r0=0.5. (This is a reasonable choice as agents are
not supposed to change names easily in grids. Otherwise, a low r0 should be
employed to render reputation building more difficult.) Time is assumed to
be slotted. At each time slot, users submit workflow tasks to the grid VO,
which are allocated to groups dynamically formed on the spot by the grid
service broker. Specifically, the grid service broker sorts the agents based
on their reputation values and selects the N agents with the top reputation
values that are eligible to participate to form the working cluster. Ideally,
this selection should be done based on the true success probability of the
nodes. This approach provides an upper bound on the achievable efficiency
of any reputation-based selection and is referred to as IDEAL. Note that,
without any reputation metric, random selection could only be employed,
achieving the expected success ratio of a randomly selected group, i.e. 0.05.
For simplicity, we assume that service instances are completed in one time
slot. However, we take that the probability of an agent being available to
perform tasks at a time slot is 0.3. This availability value is selected so as the
group of eligible agents per time slot to be significantly different. The group
size is considered fixed, i.e. with N=10. Also, when rating is applicable,
we consider that each agent has a certain rating type, which is orthogonal
to its performance type: “honest” and “collusive”. Honest agents always
rate truthfully the performance of other agents. On the other hand, collu-
sive agents always demote honest ones for their performance and promote
their colleagues. All results presented constitute mean values and confidence
intervals of 10 runs.
6.2. A Single Virtual Organization
Initially, we take that the working cluster fails in collaborative task accom-
plishment if more than M=3 of its members fail. If agents are truthful, the
relative effectiveness of the various approaches for revealing hidden individual
performance based on the collective outcome is shown in Figure 1. The two
rating-based approaches perform close to IDEAL, while BAYES approach
follows. Note that when the effectiveness of the rating-based approaches is
similar, then RATE ONE approach should be employed as being more eco-
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nomical in terms of communication overhead. Another result depicted in
Figure 1 is that the simple PUNISH ALL approach is more effective than
the other more sophisticated ones that do not employ ratings and achieves
success ratio very close to rating-based approaches.
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Figure 1: Agents are truthful and M=3. The approaches are ordered as in the legend.
Next, we examine how the tolerance threshold (i.e. the number of re-
dundant agents) M affects the effectiveness of the various reputation update
approaches. As shown in Figure 2, with truthful agents and M=2, the ef-
fectiveness of the various reputation update approaches that do not employ
ratings diminishes considerably for lower M values. This is due to the in-
creased difficulty in identifying low-performing agents in the group, e.g. more
agents are punished than those that deserve so with PUNISH ALL and fewer
than those that deserve so with WORST M and RANDOM M. On the other
hand, rating-based approaches are still very effective, as the aggregation of
truthful ratings of other group agents identify low-performing ones.
Henceforth, for clarity reasons, we only depict the effectiveness of the best
reputation update approaches, namely RATE ALL, RATE ONE, BAYES and
PUNISH ALL. If the tolerance threshold M is relatively high (M=3), then
the effectiveness of the rating-based approaches remains high for collusive
agents consisting up to N/3 of the population of the grid VO, which is the
theoretical threshold for Byzantine agreement, as depicted in Figure 3. Note
that non-rating-based approaches are not affected by the presence of liars.
On the other hand, if the tolerance threshold M is lower, then rating-based
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Figure 2: Agents are truthful, but M=2.
approaches become ineffective in the presence of collusive agents, as depicted
in Figure 4 for 30% collusive agents and M=2. This is because fewer guilty
agents have to be identified among the N agents of the group and, as now
majorities of false ratings can be formed, the performance of rating-based
approaches is negatively affected. The effect of lying to the rating-based
approaches is even more severe forM=1. Note that, as experimentally found,
the effectiveness of BAYES and PUNISH ALL approaches is irrelevant to the
percentage of collusive liar agents and increases with the tolerance threshold.
This is because the more the guilty agents for a collective service provision
failure the more agents correctly take the blame for the collective failure.
However, BAYES is only applicable in presence of fixed pre-known agent
performance types in the VO. We omit these results for brevity reasons.
We have also considered the case that the distribution of the fixed per-
formance types of agents is Uniform in [0, 1]. As depicted in Figure 5, the
RATE ALL approach still performs very close to IDEAL. On the other hand,
RATE ONE is no longer effective, as the limited ratings of this approach
severely affect the accuracy of the estimation of the individual performance
of agents. The other approaches fall behind from RATE ALL in terms of
effectiveness and only PUNISH ALL achieves a success ratio above 0.5%.
Note that BAYES approach is not applicable for this distribution of agent
performance.
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Figure 3: 30% of agents are collusive liars and M=3.
6.3. Multiple Collaborative VOs
We now evaluate the estimation approaches when they are employed by
multiple collaborating grid service brokers that share the requests among
them, aiming to collectively achieve the highest possible overall success ra-
tio, rather than each of them to optimize some individual performance object.
According to this scenario, we now simulate a consortium of 8 VOs that col-
laboratively serve user requests. Each VO consists of 100 agents that belong
to equal shares of two fixed performance types “High” and “Low” as before.
The performance of a grid service broker is estimated by means of reputa-
tion (i.e. group reputation) and especially using Beta aggregation [19]. We
assume that the user employs grid service broker selection probabilistically
fair with respect to their reputation values. This choice avoids the concen-
tration of all service requests to the most reputable provider. Note that this
reputation-based grid service broker selection policy would have been almost
equivalent with the Highest Reputation one [22], according to which the bro-
ker with the available resources that had the highest reputation would be
selected, if we had assumed that grid service brokers were not always capa-
ble of serving new requests. In this scenario, we are interested in the overall
success ratio achieved by the collaborative brokers when they all employ the
same approach for estimating the performance of their individual agents. In
Figure 6, depicted are these success ratios collaboratively achieved by the
grid service brokers for each of the estimation approaches. In the following
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Figure 4: 30% of agents are collusive liars and M=2.
graphs, we refrain from depicting the confidence intervals for clarity rea-
sons. Comparing Figure 6 with Figure 3, we observe that the performance of
the estimation approaches is not very different when observing fewer trans-
action outcomes per policy. Specifically, rating-based approaches are the
most effective and followed by PUNISH ALL. However, the effectiveness of
all approaches decreases, as expected due to the lower number of collective
outcomes per VO and the subsequent slower convergence of the reputation
values of individual agents to their performance. On the other hand, BAYES
is the most negatively affected by the sharing of service assignments and
respectively of service outcome observations among VOs.
6.4. Multiple Competitive VOs
In this subsection, we simulate 8 grid service brokers each representing
one VO that compete each other for service requests and each employing a
different estimation approach for the individual performance of their agents.
The performance of each grid service broker is again estimated by means of
reputation, i.e. Beta aggregation. Also, the users select brokers probabilisti-
cally fair to their reputation, as in the previous scenario. In order to avoid any
random bias toward an approach, we allow for a period of 160 transactions
in the beginning of the experiments the transactions to be equally shared
among brokers. We first assume that the agents of each VO belong to two
performance types “High” and “Low”, as above. As depicted in Figure 7, the
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Figure 5: Uniform distribution of agent performance, while 30% of agents are collusive
liars and M=3.
brokers that employ BAYES and PUNISH ALL approaches achieve the high-
est success ratios. Also, as depicted in Figure 8, the brokers with the same
two estimation approaches receive the highest numbers of service requests.
Although rating-based approaches are still effective, they fall behind BAYES
and PUNISH ALL due to the presence of collusive liars. Therefore, although
BAYES does not perform effectively when employed collaboratively, it is very
effective when employed against other approaches. This is because BAYES
and PUNISH ALL perform better in distinguishing performance types of
agents earlier than other approaches and, as a result, they then concentrate
more service requests. However, if all competitive brokers employ BAYES,
then they would achieve lower efficiency and thus at least one of them would
have the incentive to deviate toward a rating-based or the PUNISH ALL
approach. Therefore, BAYES is not a stable choice for a grid service bro-
ker in a competitive environment. The most effective stable solutions are
the rating-based ones, if ratings are available and the presence of collusive
liars is not very high. Otherwise, PUNISH ALL is the most effective stable
approach in a competitive environment.
Finally, we consider that, in the same scenario, the performance types
of the agents of each competitive VO are uniformly distributed in [0, 1].
In this case, the RATE ALL and PUNISH ALL estimation approaches are
equivalently effective and achieved the highest throughputs of successfully
delivered services, as depicted in Figures 9 and 10. RATE ONE is not very
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Figure 6: Same estimation approach collaboratively employed by 8 brokers, while 30% of
the agents are collusive liars and M=3.
effective in this case, as was also expected by Figure 5. However, their
achieved success ratios are lower than those in Figure 7, because discovering
the performance of individual agents is more difficult in this case. Note that
BAYES is not applicable for this performance distribution of agents.
Overall, RATE ALL and PUNISH ALL are consistently very effective
and stable choices for a broker in a competitive environment. However, in
large groups with high collusion the last resort would be the PUNISH ALL
approach, which achieves fair-enough effectiveness in all cases, provided that
a large-enough tolerance threshold is employed. Recall from Section 4 that
the more effective is an approach in estimating individual performance the
stronger are the incentives for higher performance to individual agents inside
a broker that employs a reputation-based selection policy, as proved in [22].
This is also true for dynamically rational performance strategies according
to [22]. Although two simple behavioral models for agents have been consid-
ered in the experiments, the results would be similar for any static behavioral
model. The estimation of dynamic behavior is in general more difficult and
it depends on the percentage of agents that follow rational strategies and the
speed of convergence of the various reputation update approaches. However,
it has to be noted that if rational agents are aware of the specific reputa-
tion update approach for the estimation of their individual performance, then
there may exist performance strategies to avoid detection of low performance
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Figure 7: Different estimation approaches employed by 8 competitive brokers, while 30%
of the agents are collusive liars and M=3.
from that particular approach. If several computationally “cheap” reputa-
tion update approaches are employed in parallel, then it will be trickier for
agents of the rational performance strategy to avoid detection of their low
performance. Specifically, any different trends in the reputation value of an
agent from the various approaches would indicate strategic behavior. Further
investigation of alleviating rational strategies that try to circumvent specific
reputation update approaches is left for future work.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have identified and classified the different information
asymmetry cases of grid systems. The most interesting one arises when only
the “collective outcome” of a group of agents can be observed, as opposed
to the individual performance of each agent. We argued how a proper rep-
utation metric can facilitate the solution of the task assignment problem
faced by the grid service broker in case that individually rational strategies
are employed by grid agents. We have proposed several reputation-based
approaches to deal with this issue. We experimentally found the ranking
of these reputation-based approaches based on their accuracy for estimat-
ing individual agents’ performance. If intermediate outcomes are exchanged
among truthful agents, rating-based approaches are very efficient in identi-
fying low-performing agents. Yet, if high collusion arises among agents that
do not belong to known performance types, then the simple deterministic
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Figure 8: Different estimation approaches employed by 8 competitive brokers, while 30%
of the agents are collusive liars and M=3.
PUNISH ALL approach can provide an effective solution to this informa-
tion asymmetry problem, provided that a large enough tolerance threshold
is employed.
Also, we experimentally found the effectiveness of the estimation ap-
proaches in collaborative and competitive scenarios among multiple virtual
organizations. According to our results, rating-based and PUNISH ALL ap-
proaches are the most effective stable ones for estimating the performance of
individual agents and provide the right incentives for exerting high individual
performance. However, between the rating-based approaches, RATE ONE
is involves less communication overhead, but only RATE ALL is efficient in
case that the performance distribution of agents is unknown.
Therefore, in an actual service paradigm, a grid service broker should
employ coupled the PUNISH ALL and RATE ALL approaches, but initially
only employ reputation values calculated with the PUNISH ALL approach
for agent selection. Then, the broker should periodically estimate the level of
collusion in the VO by comparing against each other the performance rank-
ings of agents resulting by these approaches. If they differ below a threshold,
then the grid service provider should employ RATE ALL for calculating rep-
utation values of individual agents for maximizing the success ratio of the
VO in service provision; otherwise, the broker should continue employing
PUNISH ALL.
As a future work, we intend to investigate the dynamics for VO forma-
tion in competitive environments where rational agents of hidden individual
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Figure 9: Uniform distribution of agent performance, different estimation approaches em-
ployed by 8 competitive brokers, while 30% of the agents are collusive liars and M=3.
performance are able to change VOs.
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